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Is there a trade gap between tax havens, and is this trade gap affected by exchange of 
information agreements? This thesis aims to show that value preserving objects can be used 
as a mean for money laundering or tax evasion across borders. This is done through trade gap 
and difference-in-differences analyses. The trade gap analyses show that there exists a positive 
trade gap and that this gap increases with the partner countries’ secrecy. The difference-in-
differences analyses reveal that this gap starts to diminish slightly before and after an exchange 
of information agreement is signed.  These trends were not observed in the robustness check 
when testing industrial diamonds and mineral ores/scraps.  
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Section 1 - Introduction 
Since the financial crisis in 2008, more resources have been put in place in the fight against 
money laundering. But even though anti-money laundering has come into increasing focus, 
the principle focus is still on the financial sector and more recently crypto currencies 
(European Parliament, 2018). In this thesis, I will look at how value-preserving objects can be 
used in money laundering, and what impact exchange of information agreements have on this.  
One of the problems when studying money laundering is that it is very difficult to measure. I 
circumvent this by applying the method of trade gap analysis, which is a method that measures 
the difference between reported imports and exports. In this thesis, I study what Switzerland 
reports in terms of imports, compared to what partner countries report having exported to 
Switzerland.  
The background for choosing Switzerland is that Switzerland is known for its bank secrecy, 
and previous literature finds that tax evaders and launderers prefer to send their money 
between countries with strong bank secrecy laws (Johannesen & Zucman, 2014). I therefore 
expect money launderers to use Switzerland when sending money to tax havens. Since there 
is a strong incentive for importers to report while importing, and less so for exporters when 
moving valuables secretly, I expect there to be a difference in the reported trade. The question 
I want to answer in this thesis is therefore: 
Have exchange of information agreements impacted the flow of valuables (for example: 
art, gold, diamonds, etc.) between countries implicated in Money Laundering? 
I try to answer this problem by applying two hypotheses, where the first is to control that there 
exists a flow of valuables, and the second, whether that flow is affected by exchange of 
information agreements. The products I test are products that Teichmann (2017) identified  in 
his study as being linked to money laundering.  
I apply trade gap analyses closely following the method proposed by Fisman and Wei (2004) 
and control the gap against the Financial Secrecy Index to test the first hypothesis. Previous 
literature on this topic mainly considers the relationship between trade gap and corruption. In 
this thesis the Secrecy Index is used because countries that score highly on the Secrecy Index 




To test the second hypothesis, I use difference-in-differences to measure if there has been a 
change after information agreements are signed. This is further controlled through an event 
study, to see how trade gap change over time before and after signing the agreement. I also 
control for whether the changes are different for tax havens and non-tax havens. 
This thesis finds that there is a significant relationship between trade gap and secrecy for 
almost all value-preserving objects. This was not the case when testing the trade gap for 
industrial diamonds and mineral scraps/ores, showing that the trade gap does not come from 
a lack of reporting, but rather a lack of recordings.  
The difference-in-differences analyses show that the trade gap gets negatively affected from 
signing exchange agreements, which means that the agreements reduce the trade gap. 
Countries that are classified as tax havens show, for the most part, a significant negative 
relationship. There was also little change when omitting the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the 
observations, meaning that it is not outliers driving the results.  
The implications of these findings are that there are indications that value-preserving objects 
are used for money laundering and tax evasion purposes. Exchange of information has an 
effect on this praxis. More efforts should be put in to see to which degree these objects are 
used for money laundering or tax evasion, and the anti-money laundering standards might 
need to focus more on this sort of money laundering.  
Money Laundering: Background 
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Section 2 - Money Laundering: Background 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Money laundering 
According to US Department of the Treasury, money laundering is: 
…the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e., "dirty money") appear legal 
(i.e., "clean"). … First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the 
legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, 
sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is 
integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty 
money" appears "clean". (History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws | FinCEN.Gov, 
2021) 
The goal of money laundering (ML) is to make the money seem as though it was obtained 
from a legal source. All ML involves money obtained through illegal means and making it 
appear as if it came from a legitimate transaction. There are two levels of ML, low-level and 
high-level ML (Levi, 2002). A low-level or “street-level” launderer is a launderer who is 
laundering small amounts of money, this could be for example a low-level criminal who 
launders a few thousand dollars a year from dealing drugs. A high-level or “organized-level” 
launderer is a launderer who launders large amount of money, this is usually done through a 
network on a global scale (Levi, 2002).  
The ML process can be described quite simple. It is in essence only three steps (Schneider & 
Windischbauer, 2008): 
1. Placement – Placement is where illegally-generated money first enters a legal 
bank/economic system. Most common methods are cash based, such as inflating cash 
receipts from a cash-heavy business or making an expensive purchase such as art or 
jewelry with cash. These days there are restrictions in almost every country on 
depositing large amounts of cash, so placement is often done with the use of 
‘structuring’ (Reuter, 2004). Structuring involves using multiple accounts controlled 
by the money launderer and depositing cash in amounts right under the reporting 
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threshold. The problem with structuring is that although it can be used for low- and 
mid-level money laundering, it would not be efficient for a high-level money 
laundering operation (Reuter, 2004). For example, to structure 5 billion NOK through 
DNB would take over 50.000 deposits, even if using the relatively rare 1.000 NOK 
note.   
 
2. Layering – Layering is where the money launderer hides the laundering activity. The 
primary purpose of this step is to separate the illicit money from its source. There are 
mainly two methods here, the first is that the money launderer buys financial 
instruments using a financial institution (Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008). The other 
is buying a material asset using cash, then selling it.  
 
3. Integration – Integration is the last step in the ML process. It is here the money 
launderer regains control of the money which has now been cleaned through a series 
of financial transactions (Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008).  
What is important to note is that not all three phases need to come into play. Financial fraud 
is an example of this, as when the money is transferred from a legitimate fund to a fraudulent 
(or under a fake identity) account, the proceeds are already in the financial system (Levi & 
Soudijn, 2020). Another example of this is if the cash is used directly to purchase an asset, 
then the money launderer can skip both placement and layering.  
2.1.2 Tax Havens 
The term ‘tax haven’ similarly to money laundering, is a recent term. The term ‘tax haven’ in 
modern terms has no agreed upon definition. When talking about tax havens today we usually 
describe a tax jurisdiction or a country as being a tax haven when it has no or very low 
corporate taxes. But what is a tax haven? One of the most well-known definitions of a tax 
haven today is from the OECD’s report from 1998 which proposed four key factors: 
1) No or nominal tax on the relevant income;   
2) Lack of effective exchange of information;   
3) Lack of transparency;   
4) No substantial activities (OECD, 1998).  
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The first key factor is that tax havens have low or no taxes on income, but that in itself is not 
sufficient to classify a country as a tax haven according to the OECD (OECD, 1998). The 
second and third factors address the lack of transparency and exchange. These factors are part 
of the business model of a tax haven, which is to enable banks or other financial institutions 
to accept capital from anywhere without disclosing any information about its origin. Thus, this 
makes them ideal for people wishing to hide the origin of their capital (typically criminals) 
(Schjelderup, 2015).  
The 4th and last key factor comes from that most tax havens forbid companies to have any 
activity if they use the favorable part of the tax system, often named “foreign investor regime” 
(Schjelderup, 2015). It indicates that a jurisdiction does not provide a legal or commercial 
environment that would attract any substantive business activities (OECD, 1998). 
2.1.3 Financial Secrecy Index 
Similarly to the tax haven lists there is also the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). The FSI 
calculates different measures of secrecy but is different from tax haven lists as the goal is to 
measure contribution to the problem of financial secrecy (Tax Justice Network, 2021a). The 
FSI list uses different indicators but shares similarities with the tax haven lists according to 
the Tax Justice Network (2021a). These indicators can be described in four dimensions: 
1) ownership registration;  
2) legal entity transparency;  
3) integrity of tax and financial regulation; and  
4) international standards and cooperation (Tax Justice Network, 2021a).  
Ownership registration is an indicator that shows if records are clear on who the beneficial 
owners are and not only the legal owners (Tax Justice Network, 2021b). Legal entity 
transparency ranks how transparent ownership and accounting data are to the general public 
(Tax Justice Network, 2021b). Integrity of tax and financial regulation gives indications for 
whether or not the local tax laws are enforced and if there is lenient tax residency (Tax Justice 
Network, 2021b). International standard and cooperation covers willingness to enforce 
international anti-money laundering (AML) standards and exchange information (Tax Justice 
Network, 2021b). 
 
Money Laundering: Background 
6 
 
2.1.4 Reasons to launder 
The principle reason for laundering money is to make money earned in an illegitimate way 
appear to have come from a legitimate one (Cox, 2012)(Cox, 2012).  ML is primarily used so 
criminals can spend their gains earned through illegitimate means while attempting to avoid 
difficult questions about the source of their earnings (Cox, 2012). ML can also be used to let 
criminals pay income tax on their ill-gotten earnings in hopes of avoiding arrest for tax-evasion 
(Cox, 2012). 
Despite the desires for some criminals to pay taxes, a second reason to launder money is to 
avoid paying taxes; by laundering income in such a way that the source of the income becomes 
obscure, it is possible to conceal that taxes due were not paid to the relevant government (Cox, 
2012). Finally, there exists a method that is known as ‘reverse money laundering’. This is, as 
the name indicates, taking money that is legitimate and obscuring its origins so that it can be 
used to finance criminals and terrorists (Cassella, 2004).  
2.2 Money laundering methods 
In this section I will describe how ML can be done through smuggling value preserving objects 
to Switzerland. The objects looked at in this thesis comes from Teichmann (2017), who did an 
extensive study looking into 12 common ways ML can be done. I single out the objects that 
can be used for cross-border ML, and those are: raw diamonds, gold, antiques, jewellery, and 
art.  
2.2.1 Money laundering through raw diamonds 
Teichmann and Falker (2020b) interviewed German, Austrian and Swiss launderers that have 
used raw diamonds or laundering. They find that raw diamonds are very suitable for ML. 
When studying the ML process one can see that raw diamonds fit into all the steps. They are 
suitable for placement; their origins are not traceable, and with complex structures they can 
also be used for layering and integration (Teichmann & Falker, 2020b). Launderers who use 
diamonds in integration are more inclined to establish a legal entity to officially acquire 
diamonds.   (Teichmann & Falker, 2020b). Raw diamonds can be purchased directly from 
miners, and Kimberley certificates, which is needed to sell diamonds legitimately, can be 
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bought on the black market (Teichmann & Falker, 2020b). There is therefore no need for the 
launderer to import illegally.  
2.2.2 Money laundering with gold 
Teichmann and Falker (2020a) also find that gold is very suitable for ML. Gold is suitable for 
both placement and layering, as gold is easily melted which gives an effortless option to hide 
the origins. The main problem with laundering gold into Switzerland comes from registration 
demand and AML laws. In Switzerland, gold traders must do due diligence on customers 
(Teichmann & Falker, 2020a). This creates a problem as it shows that the launderer possesses 
a large amount of cash. The launderer would therefore seek to purchase gold from a private 
person or foreign-based vendors (Teichmann & Falker, 2020a). Italian jewellers are known to 
prefer investing in goods without providing a receipt, and this opens up for a black market in 
which large amounts of gold are traded (Teichmann & Falker, 2020a).   
2.2.3 Money laundering with antiques 
Teichmann (2019) finds that the antiquities market in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is 
not regulated, and that in many cases AML laws do not apply. Further the antiquities market 
is characterized by high revenues, which makes it possible to sell antique objects for large 
amounts of money without raising suspicion. This makes antiques suitable for placement, 
layering and integration. Ideally a launderer would set up a company to trade antiques. They 
then purchase and sell real antiques, but also report to have purchased and sold fictitious 
antiques which do not exist (Teichmann, 2019). They can also create fictitious customers and 
report that they sold items with cash since Switzerland’s AML laws do not apply for cash 
payments of less than 100.000 CHF (Teichmann, 2019). 
2.2.4 Money laundering with art 
Teichmann (2017) finds that art is a very suitable for both placement and layering. Art has 
similar characteristics as antiques as a lot of money is spent in the art market, and it lacks 
transparency. Switzerland has since 2016 taken steps to fight art being used for ML and 
increase transparency in trade of high value art (Steiner, 2017). Some launderers uses duty-
free warehouses, so called freeports to store art indefinitely. The new requirements that came 
into force from 2016 is that art purchases over 100.000 CHF have to be reported and freeports 
Money Laundering: Background 
8 
 
now have a time limit of six-months (Steiner, 2017). Freeport managers also have to try find 
the beneficial owner of the goods stored in the freeports (Steiner, 2017). 
2.2.5 Money laundering with jewellery 
Teichmann (2020) finds that jewellery is very suitable for both placement and layering. 
Jewellery is similar to art and antiques in that jewellery can be purchased in Switzerland with 
cash payments without identification as long as the payment is under 100.000 CHF. It is also 
similar in that jewellery has no fixed market price, which makes it difficult to accurately assess 
its worth. The process is the same for jewellery as for art and antiques. The launderer can open 
a store and sell jewellery and report fictitious private sellers.  
2.3 Different information exchange agreements over time 
The OECD has made three forms of exchange of information agreements (EIA) (1) exchange 
of information on request (EOIR), (2) Automatic exchange of information (AEOI), (3) and 
spontaneous exchange of information (SEOI). In this section I outline the main characteristics 
of these agreements and how they are used to combat tax evasion and money laundering is 
outlined.   
2.3.1 Exchange of information on request  
The exchange of information on request (EOIR) agreement is a form of agreement where a 
jurisdiction enquires about specific information (OECD, 2016), normally for one taxpayer 
with specified years. If the requested authority does not already possess that information, it 
must obtain it by its own means (OECD, 2016). Therefore, the EOIR can be seen as “passive” 
exchange of information, as the requesting tax jurisdiction has no control or jurisdiction over 
the requested tax jurisdiction (Seer & Kargitta, 2020). This makes the requestor dependent on 
the requested jurisdiction to be effective.  
The EOIR standard states that the information gathered can be used for other purposes then 
taxes, such as anti-money laundering, the only restrictions are that that use is permitted in both 
the contracting and the supplying country, and that the supplying country permits such use 
(OECD, 2016). That the use is on the goodwill of the supplying country can make it so 
countries that are already non-transparent will not be forced to help contracting countries.  
Money Laundering: Background 
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Figure 1: EOIR agreements over time 
 
 
2.3.2 Automatic exchange of information  
As an advancement of the EOIR, the Automatic exchange of information (AEOI) was 
established. AEOI is the exchange of information without having to request it. There have 
been ongoing discussions about having automatic exchange between tax jurisdictions, but the 
first global initiative was started by OECD in 2013 and 44 “early adopters” signed it in 2014, 
it has since grown to have 94 jurisdictions at the time of writing this thesis.  
To implement the AEOI standard, the tax jurisdiction has to collect all the financial 
information from all financial institutions and automatically share it with the tax jurisdiction 
where the account holder is a resident (OECD, 2021a). This makes the AEOI an “active” 
exchange agreement. Financial institutions also must report who are the beneficial owners, the 
“controlling persons”, of active and passive entities.   
This gives insight into the real owners of companies, and it makes the information flow more 
effective as the requesting jurisdiction can get all the information without having to wait for 
the requested jurisdiction to send the information. This makes the AEOI an effective way to 
share tax information on a global scale, and it makes it a lot more difficult for tax evaders to 
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Figure 2: AEOI agreements over time 
 
2.3.3 Spontaneaous exchange of information 
At the same time as the AEOI, the OECD came up with spontaneous exchange of information 
(SEOI) which is another framework for how information can be shared across borders. The 
SEOI is an exchange of information where a tax jurisdiction shares information it believes can 
be relevant to a specific case without it having been requested (OECD, 2015). This relies 
heavily on active participation and cooperation from local tax authorities. The SEOI is a very 
suitable tool when used right as it creates an uncertainty for money launders as the information 
can be shared at any time without there being a request as the EOIR demands. How often this 
tool has been used is uncertain, as there is no public record that gives any overview of how 
often authorities exchange information spontaneously.  
2.4 Switzerland 
Switzerland has taken multiple steps in the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing. This has been primarily through its involvement with the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF). Switzerland participated in the drafting of the FATF 40 Recommendations in 
1990, which have been recognized as an important global standard. They have also been part 
of several conventions such as: 
• Terrorist Financing Convention, 1999 












2017 2018 2019 2020
THs AEOI
Total AEOI
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• United Nations Convention against transnational Organized Crime (Palermo 
Convention), 2000 
• United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), 2003 
• Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 2001  
 
2.4.1 Bank secrecy in Switzerland 
Switzerland is well known for its strict bank secrecy laws. The modern bank secrecy laws in 
Switzerland stem from the 1934 Federal Banking Law, Article 4 which made client privacy 
stricter and criminalized anyone who broke that trust (Poddar et al., 2009).  
There has been a lot of pressure on Switzerland after the 1934 Federal Banking Law to lessen 
the secrecy laws, and Switzerland has taken steps to accommodate the requests. In 1967 Swiss 
Bankers’ Association directed their members to not accept any money before tracing its 
origins. They also urged banks to not advertise Swiss Banks as a “Financial Safe Haven”. In 
1973, Switzerland signed a treaty with the US for mutual judicial assistance in criminal cases.  
Switzerland passed an anti-money laundering law in 1997 that makes an exception in the 
Federal Banking Act (State Secretariat for International Finance SIF, 2021a). This law requires 
Swiss banks to report all suspicious transactions to the Money Laundering Office. This law 
was passed because there was strong evidence that Swiss banks were used for money 




Section 3 - Literature review 
3.1 Determinents of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is a part of the process of a criminal business, and economic theory assumes 
that businesses will take all necessary steps to ensure that they get the maximum profit possible 
with the risk-level they find tolerable (Becker, 2017). Thus, it can be expected that a business, 
even if that business is engaged in illegal activities, will engage in money laundering if it can 
help increase the maximum profit within the tolerable risk-level of the business.  
That leads into the most common assumption when dealing with money laundering: “crime 
demands crime”. This assumption comes from the fact that money laundering is part of the 
process of a criminal business. Studies have found that this assumption is based on reality, and 
that fighting money laundering can help reduce crime (Ferwerda, 2009). 
3.2 Information exchange impact on tax evasion and money 
laundering 
In this section I will look at the impact information exchange agreements have on tax evaders. 
The reason for that is that the countries that most ML flows also tend to serve as TH.  
Johannesen and Zucman (2014) find that EIA had an impact on the deposits in tax havens. 
They found that the tax evaders moved their bank deposits from countries that signed tax 
exchange agreements to tax havens that did not have such agreements with their home 
countries. In my framework this implies that flows of ML would increase for countries that 
have not signed the EIA. I contribute by checking whether this intuition holds for ML objects.  
Menkhoff and Miethe (2019) built on the findings of Johannesen and Zucman (2014) and find 
that there was a decline of 27,5% in bank deposits in the tax havens in the period of 2003 to 
2017. They find the shift to be something that only happened for a brief period in an 
anticipation for the treaty signature. Menkhoff and Miethe (2019) speculate that tax evaders 
have adapted and found new ways to circumvent regulations. If that is the case, then one way 
to circumvent regulation would be to convert money into value preserving objects. In my thesis 
I will identify exactly this flow of objects to determine whether this regulation avoidance 




Casi et al. (2020) had similar findings as Menkhoff and Miethe (2019) when looking at the 
AEOI agreement. They looked at the period between 2014 to 2017 and found a decline in 
offshore deposits of up to 14%. They also saw that there was an increase in deposits flowing 
to the US. The reason for this seems to come from the adoption of the AEOI and the 
introduction of the CRS. The reason why US might be a favorable destination for tax evaders 
is due to US being one of the few major economies not committing to CRS. This is consistent 
with the findings of (Menkhoff & Miethe) and seems to be a way for tax evaders to circumvent 
the AEOI agreement.  
3.3 Gap in reported trade 
In this thesis I will identify the flows of money laundering by applying the method proposed 
by Fisman and Wei (2004) and used in Fisman and Wei (2009). Fisman and Wei study the gap 
between import to the US and export from partner countries. In this thesis I will look at the 
import to Switzerland and countries reporting export to Switzerland.  
Fisman and Wei (2004) proposed a method to study trade gap or “evasion gap”. They studied 
the trade between China and Hong Kong and found that the gap increased by 3% per 1% 
increase in tax rates. This implies that the trade gap will be larger for tax havens due to that 
they typically have a low tax rate.  
Similar to Fisman and Wei (2009) there are very low tariff rates when importing to 
Switzerland, hence very low incentive for importers to lie to Swiss customs. There is also the 
strong incentive to report as not reporting can impose large fines or be prosecuted, and it can 
be pursued not only when crossing the borders, but also subsequently (FCA, 2021).  
Kellenberg and Levinson (2019) find similar findings as Fisman and Wei (2009). They find 
that underreporting of exports increases with the exporters’ tax rates, and that corruption is 
significant explaining motivations for underreporting of exports. In this thesis I will use 
secrecy instead of corruption.  
Collin (2020) found that money launderers used trade-based money laundering to launder 
money across borders. He found that this is being done by obscuring the true price or quantity 
of the goods that is being exported or imported. In my thesis I will test these findings by 




This has been seen with that the evasion gap shifts depending on tariffs, and that there is a 
positive correlation with tax rates (Collin, 2020). Similar findings where found by Chalendard 
(2017) who saw that evasion increased with tax rates. We therefore have to consider in this 




Section 4 - Methodology 
In this section I will present the method for data collection, and the methods for analysis. 
Lastly, I present the hypotheses related to the research questions.  
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Trade data 
The trade data are retrieved from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. The 
period used in this analysis is from 1988 to 2020. The product codes extracted can be found 
in the appendix. There were two nomenclatures used, one from the SITC3 and another from 
SITC4. The different product descriptions are shown side by side in the complete list in the 
appendix.  
When extracting the data, I aggregated them down to sub-groups (4-digit product groups), as 
that was the most suitable. In a 3-digit group, one would classify all antiques and art into one 
category. It also gives the flexibility to study the sub-groups as groups by just using the first 3 
digits. For example, the digits 896 – represent art and collectibles on a group level, but in the 
sub-group level it is split into 6 sub-groups with 4 digits (8961, 8962 …). That means that on 
a 4-digit level one can look at 8966 – antiques, but also aggregate all into 896 to look at art as 
a group. Table 1 show the description of the products used in the analyses and robustness 
checks. 
Table 1: Overview SITC 4 and SITC 3 with description 
SITC revision 41 SITC revision 32 
2771 -- Industrial diamonds, sorted, whether or not 
worked 
2771 -- Indust diamonds,sorted 
2772 -- Natural abrasives, n.e.s. 2772 -- Natural abrasives n.e.s. 
2891 -- Precious metal ores and concentrates 2891 -- Precious metal ore/conc 
2892 -- Waste and scrap of precious metal (other than 
gold) or of metals clad with precious metal (other than 
gold) 




6671 -- Pearls (natural or cultured), whether or not 
worked or graded but not strung, mounted or set; 
ungraded pearls (natural or cultured), temporarily 
strung for convenience of transport 
6671 -- Pearls not strung/set 
6672 -- Diamonds (other than sorted industrial 
diamonds), whether or not worked, but not mounted 
or set 
6672 -- Diamonds unset 
6673 -- Precious stones (other than diamonds) and 
semiprecious stones, whether or not worked or graded 
but not strung, mounted or set; ungraded precious 
stones (other than diamonds) and semiprecious 
stones, temporarily strung for convenience of 
transport 
6673 -- Prec/semi-p stones unset 
894 – Baby carriages, toys, games, and sporting goods  894 - Baby carriages, toys, games, and sporting goods 
8961 -- Paintings, drawings and pastels, executed 
entirely by hand, other than drawings of heading 
892.82 and other than hand-painted or hand-
decorated manufactured articles; collages and similar 
decorative plaques 
8961 -- Paintings/drawings/etc 
8962 -- Original engravings, prints & lithographs 8962 -- Original prints etc 
8963 -- Original sculptures & statuary, in any material 8963 -- Original sculpture etc 
8964 -- Postage/revenue stamps, stamp-postmarks, 
first-day covers, postal stationery (stamped paper) & 
the like, used,/if unused not of current/new issue in 
the country to which they are destined 
8964 -- Stamps for philately 
8965 -- Collections & collectors pieces of zoological, 
botanical, mineralogical, anatomical, historical, 
archaeological, palaeontological, 
ethnographic/numismatic interest 
8965 -- Coins/nature collections 
8966 -- Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred 
years 
8966 -- Antiques over 100 years 




8973 -- Jewellery of gold, silver or platinum group 
metals (except watches and watch-cases) and 
goldsmiths or silversmiths wares (including set gems) 
8973 -- Precious metal jewellery 
8974 -- Other articles of precious metal or of metal 
clad with precious metal 
8974 -- Artics nes prec mtl/clad 
9710 -- Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and 
concentrates) 
9710 -- Gold non-monetary ex ore 
1.UN Trade Statistics (2021b) 
2.UN Trade Statistics (2021a) 
  
4.1.2 Tax Havens 
As mentioned, there are no single definition of what a tax haven is, and there are many lists 
over what different organizations consider to be a tax haven. Some of these lists can have 
biases based on political beliefs or other interests, and therefore I consider a country to be a 
tax haven if it appears on two or more of the tax haven lists used in this thesis.  
I use the OECD, Oxfam, IFM, EU and FATF blacklists. I use the criteria of at least two 
mentions to mitigate the bias of these lists being colored by political or some other reasons.  
Figure 3 shows countries that are in at least two of the lists mentioned. There are 28 countries 
in total that are in at least two of these lists. Oxfam and OECD2000 are the two lists that are 
the most represented. They are also the two largest lists, so it might be expected to see some 




Figure 3: Histogram over Tax Havens in at least two lists 
 
4.1.3 Exchange of information agreements with Switzerland 
For this thesis I based the exchange on the EIA, AEOI and EOIR. There is no complete official 
list of all the agreements from OECD as OECD stopped maintaining that database. I therefore 
use the Swiss government website from the from the Staatssekretariat für internationale 
Finanzfragen (SIF) to retrieve the list (State Secretariat for International Finance SIF, 2021b). 
Their lists were also crosschecked with the IBFD (2021) tax treaties database, which is a third 
party that maintains databases on tax treaties for research purposes.   
Switzerland started signing AEOI agreements from 2016 and has had a steady increase of 
AEOI in the last years. For EOIR it has been a steady increase. Figure 4 below shows 
agreements that are still in force over time, split into agreements where information is shared 















Figure 4: Exchange of information agreement Switzerland by year 
 
 
4.1.4 Financial Secrecy Index 
For this thesis, the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) is used to show the relationship between FSI 
and gap in trade. The FSI data is retrieved from the Tax Justice Network. The FSI data is from 
the most current list, which is from 18th of February 2020 (Tax Justice Network, 2021b).  The 
FSI list covers 133 countries, and the score goes from 80 (highest) to 38 (lowest).  
Figure 5 shows a chart that displays the FSI score and its specific concentration worldwide. 
Light blue implies a low score, while dark blue implies a high score. The grey indicates a lack 
of data for a particular country, as the FSI for 2020 only consists of 133 countries. Looking at 












Figure 5: Financial Secrecy Index 2020 - Concentration around the world 
 
 
4.1.5 Issues with data 
The data comes from the trade data the countries report themselves, and because of that is hard 
to say if there is a gap in export, of if the data is underreported/missing from the partner 
countries. Barbieri et al. (2009) found that some of the datasets can have missing data, and this 
will of course impact the results and the findings. It can be that countries with higher secrecy 
have troubles with reporting or vice versa. This risk has been tried to be omitted through testing 
three other product groups in the robustness check. If the trade gaps come from problems in 
reporting, I expect to see similar findings in the robustness check.  
Another issue is custom unions, and changes over time. Some countries have different custom 
unions or join/leave custom unions over time. This can cause issues with reports. For example, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland are in a custom union, which makes it impossible to retrieve 
trade data for a specific country.  
The gap analysis is restricted to only countries that are on the FSI index, so countries that are 
not listed there will naturally get excluded from the analysis. This is something that could of 
course impact the conclusion, but the FSI index for 2020 covers 133 countries so therefore 




trade gap and the tax haven dummy, which shows that there is a relation between trade gap 
and tax haven similar to trade gap and FSI.  
4.1.6 Limitations 
There are many reasons for trade gap, ranging from tax avoidance, trade mispricing, trade 
misinvoicing and illicit financial flows. It is, therefore, hard to tell what the reasons are for a 
trade gap. Thus, it will be a mere guess that it is connected to ML. The trade gap could come 
from tax evasion (or some other reason), and it is not possible to quantify how much is or is 
not from ML. This thesis however will be able to give indicative evidence of whether or not 
there exists a trade gap, and if that trade gap gets affected by exchange of information 
agreements.  
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Trade gap analysis 
In the trade gap analysis I am looking to test Hypothesis 1: 
There is a trade gap in the flow of valuables between Switzerland and countries with 
strong secrecy. 
I hypothesize there will be a trade gap between what Switzerland reports as import and what 
countries with strong secrecy laws report as exports. My intuition is that countries that score 
high on the Financial Secrecy Index normally do not share information with other countries 
which makes them suitable for both tax evasion and money laundering.  
The methodology used in testing the hypothesis closely follows Fisman and Wei (2009). I 
am interested in the relationship between the Financial Secrecy Index and the gap in import 
and export between Switzerland and its partners. I define the gap in the following way: 
Value_Gapcy = log(1 + CHE_Importscy) – log(1 + Exports_to_CHEcy) 
Where c indexes country, y indexes year, CHE_Importscy is the imports reported by 
Switzerland from country c, and Exports_to_CHEcy is the exports reported by country c 




Value_Gapcy = FSIc + δy + εcy 
Where FSIc is the FSI secrecy score per country c and δy are year fixed effects. 
4.2.2 Regression techniques 
The goal of this regression is to explore the changes in Value_Gapcy over time as a response 
to the exchange of information agreements. This is to test hypothesis 2: 
There is a decrease in the flow of valuables shortly before, and after the EIAs are 
signed. 
This hypothesis will show if the trade gap gets affected by information agreements. The 
background for this hypothesis comes from the fact that valuables are known to be used for 
ML purposes and exchange of information agreements have had an effect on tax evasion and 
ML through capital shifts. I therefore expect to see the same trends for valuables when 
countries sign agreements. I will test this hypothesis using difference-in-differences (DID) 
regressions and run the following regression equation: 
Value_Gapcy = βI(EIA)cy + δy + γc + εcy 
Where I(EIA) is an indicator variable taking value 1 for the year y and country c with which 
Switzerland signs an agreement. δy are year fixed effects. γc are country fixed effects. I then 
estimate an event study DID. I limit the effect window to [-5. +3] and bin the endpoints of the 
effect window (Schmidheiny & Siegloch, 2020). Following common trend assumption, I 
assume that in absence of treatment, the difference between the control and treated group will 
be constant over time. Robust and clustered standard errors are used to account for potential 
problems with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.   
A coefficient of β ≠ 0 will indicate that there is indeed a trade gap in the flow between 
countries. A coefficient of β > 0 would mean that money launderers have not responded to the 




Section 5 - Results 
5.1 Trade gap analyses 
In this section I test Hypothesis 1 to see what effect secrecy has on the gap between import 
and export of valuables.  
5.1.1 Trade gap analysis of art, collectibles and antiques 
In Figure 6 the country codes are shown with their ISO3 country code number, to show the 
relationship between FSIc and Value_Gapc. where Value_Gapc will be the mean gap of 
antiques per country c. It shows there is a clear positive relationship (with a coefficient of 
0.107 at the 1% significance level). An increased secrecy in a country gives more underreports 
of exports to Switzerland. It is interesting to see countries known for tax evasion (Hong Kong, 
Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Panama) have a large underreporting of art. The reason for 
this is intuitive. It seems unlikely that this gap is fueled by a large local supply of artifacts, as 
some of these countries are not known for their art or ancient history.  
 






In Table 2, below, I expand with two more products, the gap for the art and collectibles group 
(896), paintings (8961) and antiques (8966), and compare them side by side. In the appendix 
there is a gap analysis covering all traded goods in the 896-product group.  The reason for 
these three is due to that these products are closest art described by Teichmann (2017).  
Table 2: Trade gap vs FSI, Regression results - Art and Collectibles 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 
 Art & Coll. Paintings Antiques 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FSI 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.107*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year 
Observations 28,594 2,849 1,640 
R2 0.053 0.108 0.154 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.098 0.136 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.789 (df = 28560) 2.465 (df = 2815) 2.561 (df = 1606) 
Note: 
Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; 
∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
In column 1 in Table 2, the FSI is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.073, 
leading to a one-unit increase in the FSI score, increasing the Gap by 7,3%.  This shows that 
there is a significant positive relation between secrecy and gap in trade of art. The spread in 
the gap of art is narrower than it is for antiques and paintings, which comes from that the other 
products in the 896 series have a smaller gap.  
In column 2, the FSI is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.079. This is a slightly 
higher than the one in column 2. This shows that paintings increase more than the group. The 
spread of the gap is the largest for paintings. The countries with the largest gap are the same 
as those for antiques. 
The largest of these three is column 3, at the 1% level of significance with a coefficient of 
0.107. Antiques have the largest coefficient of any product in the 896-series. The higher 




use for ML purposes. This supports Teichmann (2019) and Steiner (2017), showing that 
antiques is more susceptible to be used in the ML process.  
5.1.2 Trade gap analysis of diamonds, pearls and precious stones 
As with art and antiques, diamonds (product code 6672) are a suitable way to launder money 
(Teichmann & Falker, 2020b).  Diamonds are very easy to hide, and it can be difficult to track 
the origin of diamonds, this makes diamonds suitable for smuggling by both tax evaders and 
money launderers.  Figure 7 shows that there is a clear positive relationship (with a coefficient 
of 0.107 at the 1% significance level), between the reported gap and secrecy index. 
When looking at the gap one can see that there are known tax havens (Panama, British Virgin 
Islands, Bermuda) similar to arts that has the largest gap. The gap is also less centered towards 
null as it was with arts.  
Figure 7: Trade gap vs FSI, Diamonds 
 
 
In Table 3, I expand and take in the group, diamonds, pearls, and precious stones, (667), pearls 
(6671), diamonds (6672) and precious stones (excl. diamonds) (6673). The group naturally has 
similar spread as diamonds but is more centred. This comes from that the spread in pearls and 




Table 3: Trade gap vs FSI, Regression results – Diamonds, Pearls & Precious 
Stones 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FSI 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.172*** 0.114*** 
 (0.035) (0.026) (0.037) (0.029) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year Year 
Observations 8,387 1,071 1,593 2,005 
R2 0.120 0.250 0.150 0.154 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.226 0.132 0.140 
Residual Std. 
Error 
3.812 (df = 8353) 
2.586 (df = 
1037) 
4.290 (df = 
1559) 
2.855 (df = 
1971) 
Note: 
Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; 
∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
In column 1 in Table 3, the FSI is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.144, 
leading to a one-unit increase in the FSI score, increasing the gap by 14,4%.  This is almost 
double the increase in coefficient from column 1 in Table 2. This gives indications for that 
diamonds, pearls and precious stones are more used for money laundering then art and 
collectibles. The spread is wider for diamonds, pearls, and precious stones then it is for art and 
collectibles.  
Column 2 and 4 show a slightly smaller coefficient than column 1. That shows that in the 
group 667, the product group with the highest coefficient is diamonds. In column 3 the FSI is 
significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.172. The gap on diamonds is affected the 
most per increase in secrecy. This finding supports Teichmann and Falker (2020b). It is 
intuitive that diamonds are more suited for ML then pearls and precious stones, so it is natural 





5.1.3 Trade gap analysis of gold 
As with art and diamonds, gold is a suitable way to launder money (Teichmann & Falker, 
2020a).  Gold is easy to amalgamate, and it can be difficult to track the origin of gold, this 
makes gold suitable for smuggling by both tax evaders and money launderers. Table 5 does 
show a positive, but not significant relation with FSI, with a coefficient of 0.041. This is 
visualized in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Trade gap vs FSI, Gold 
 
The spread of the gap is very wide, and it is not significant against FSI. This can be seen in 
Figure 8, where the gap is spread in both over- and underreporting of export. The spread does 
not show any significance against FSI, as countries with high and low secrecy report both 
over- and underreporting. The spread do not follow any geographic region or income group. 
This gives indications for that gold is not used for trade-based ML with countries with higher 
secrecy. Teichmann and Falker (2020a) finds that gold was used for ML, but that the gold was 
smuggled across the border, due to strong documentation requirements. This might make gold 
not as suitable for ML purposes as the other products, and why the findings are not as 
significant. One can see that tax havens are among the countries with the highest positive trade 





Table 4: Trade gap vs FSI, Regression results – Gold 
 
 Dependent variable: 




Fixed effects Year 
Observations 1,946 
R2 0.277 
Adjusted R2 0.265 
Residual Std. 
Error 
5.106 (df = 1912) 
Note: 
Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; 
∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
5.2 Difference-in-differences 
In the trade gap analysis, one could see that there was for most products a positive relationship 
existed between trade gap and secrecy. The goal of this section is to see if the exchange of 
information agreements have had an impact on that relation. This is to test to test hypothesis 
2. This will be done through a difference-in-differences analysis and an event study.  
5.2.1 Difference-in-differences 
In the gap analysis we saw that there was for most products a positive relation between trade 
gap and secrecy. In this part I will use difference-in-differences to see if the exchange of 
information agreements has had an impact on the trade gap.  
Table 5: Trade gap vs I(EIA), Difference-in-differences results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I(EIA)  0.323** 0.378* 0.102 -0.646** -0.087 -2.167*** -0.914 -3.258*** 
 (0.151) (0.216) (0.309) (0.308) (0.412) (0.679) (0.556) (0.912) 
         
Fixed effects 
















Observations 28,594 2,849 1,640 8,387 1,071 1,593 2,005 1,946 
R2 0.149 0.478 0.482 0.366 0.595 0.597 0.553 0.528 



















4.237 (df = 
1814) 
Note: 
The exchange of information agreement dummy is set to check first for AEOI, then EOIR. I set 1 for the signing year, and 
after for AEOI first, if the country does not have AEOI agreement, it checks for EOIR. Robust standard errors clustered by 
partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
In column 1 in Table 5, I(EIA) is significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.323. This 
shows that the gap increased by 32,3% after signing the EIA. This gives indications for that 
information exchange has not had an impact on the trade gap in art and collectibles. As we 
saw in Table 2, this product group had a significant positive relation on the FSI, this gives 
indications for that art and collectibles are used for ML purposes, and that information 
exchange has not impacted that.  
In column 2, the I(EIA) is significant at the 10% level with a coefficient of 0.378. The 
coefficient for paintings is higher than it was for art and collectibles as a group, but its 
significance is lower.  In column 3, there is no significance, and the coefficient dropped to 
0.102. This shows that for antiques there was no effect from the EIA. 
In column 4, the significance is at the 5% level with a coefficient of -0.646. This shows that 
the gap is reduced by 64,6%. This shows that the group diamonds, pearls, and precious stones 
are affected negatively by signing an EIA. The subgroups pearls and precious stones in column 
5 and 7 shows no significance. It is diamonds which are affected the most, with a coefficient 
of -2.167 at the 1% level of significance.  
In column 8, the I(EIA) is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -3.258. Gold was 
the product who’s trade gap was without a significant relation to secrecy. It is therefore 




The changes from signing the EIA can be different between Tax Havens and Non-Tax Havens. 
Therefore, I use the multiplication method in Table 6 below to capture the effect of Tax Haven.  
Table 6: Trade gap vs I(EIA) and TH, Difference-in-differences results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I(EIA) 0.412** 0.511** 0.193 -0.491 0.154 -2.051*** -0.937* -3.193*** 
 (0.184) (0.225) (0.312) (0.304) (0.435) (0.685) (0.564) (0.930) 
I(EIA):TH -2.593** -1.753** -2.236 -2.507 -2.996* -1.513 0.362 -0.906 
 (1.133) (0.795) (2.563) (1.898) (1.579) (2.125) (1.282) (1.130) 
Fixed effects 
















Observations 28,594 2,849 1,640 8,387 1,071 1,593 2,005 1,946 
R2 0.152 0.481 0.486 0.369 0.603 0.598 0.553 0.528 



















4.237 (df = 
1813) 
Note: 
The exchange of information agreement dummy is set to check first for AEOI, then EOIR. I set 1 for the signing year, and 
after for AEOI first, if the country does not have AEOI agreement, it checks for EOIR. Robust standard errors clustered by 
partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
In column 1 in Table 6, the I(EIA) is significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.412. 
When adjusting I(EIA) against the TH dummy, it shows a significant at the 5% level with a 
coefficient of -2.593. This shows that countries that are not classified as Tax Havens have an 
increase in the art and collectibles trade gap after signing the EIA, but the Tax Havens have a 
significant decrease in the gap.  
This is also showed in column 2, where the decrease in trade gap for Tax Havens are at 175.3% 
after signing the agreement. In column 3, there are no significant results, showing that for 
antiques the exchange agreements have had no significant impact. There are also no significant 




pearls has had no effect. In column 5 however the I(EIA):TH is significant at the 10% level 
with a coefficient of -2.996.  
In column 6, the I(EIA) is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -2.051, while the 
I(EIA):TH is not significant. This shows that for countries that are not tax havens, the 
agreement has had a negative effect. In column 7, the I(EIA) is significant at the 10% level, 
with a coefficient of -0.937. The I(EIA) is not significant when adjusting for TH and also 
shows a positive coefficient of 0.362.  
In column 8, the I(EIA) is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -3.193. The I(EIA) 
is not significant when adjusting for TH. This shows that the agreement has had a strong 
negative effect for countries that are not tax havens for gold.  
5.2.2 Event study 
In this section I will visualize the change in the trade gap before and after signing the exchange 
agreement. I split the trade gap into two groups using the Tax Haven dummy. The event 
window is from -5 to 3, where 0 is 1 year prior to signing the agreement.  






Figure 9 visualizes all the product groups used in Table 5 and Table 6 (667, 896 and 971). The 
graph shows countries not classified as tax havens have on average almost no trade gap, so it 
is not expected to change a lot after signing the agreement. Countries that are classified as tax 
havens however have on average a higher trade gap, and it seems to diminish from around 
event window 0 (1 year prior to signing the agreement), and afterwards. This is supporting the 
findings from Table 6. For some products, the error bar is too big to say anything conclusively, 
but it gives indicative evidence that the EIA has had an impact on the trade gap on countries 
classified as tax havens. A full list of event studies per product can be found in the appendix.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
5.3.1 Gap analysis robustness check 
In the robustness check I control against products that are not known to be used for money 
laundering purposes and share similar tariff rates as the other products in this thesis. I have 
chosen three product groups; industrial diamonds (277), mineral ores/scraps (289) and toys 
(894). The reason for checking these products is to show that the correlation and trade gap 
found on valuables is not a coincidence. I will further control the regressions done in 5.1 by 
omitting 2.5% of the top and bottom observations and controlling against GDP.  
Table 7: Trade gap vs FSI, robustness check 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 
 Industrial Diamonds Mineral Ores / Scraps Toys 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FSI 0.007 0.001 0.076*** 
 (0.024) (0.036) (0.012) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year 
Observations 1,847 1,440 2,335 
R2 0.020 0.062 0.669 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.040 0.665 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.592 (df = 1813) 4.345 (df = 1406) 2.345 (df = 2301) 
Note: 
Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; 





In column 2 and 3, in Table 6, the FSI is not significant. This shows that trade gap in neither 
industrial diamonds or mineral ores is affected by secrecy. In column 3, the FSI is significant 
at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.076. The gap for toys however does not show signs of 
underreporting in exports, but rather an overreporting from countries that scores low on the 
Financial Secrecy Index. Countries that score high in secrecy show a null gap. So, the reason 
for overreporting in this product group is most likely not linked illicit flows.  
In Table 13 I omit the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the observations, and rerun the regressions 
done in section 5.1. The table shows that there are no changes in the significance of the FSI, 
and the coefficients are just slightly smaller. This shows that the findings are not caused by 
any large outliers. In Table 14 the trade gap is controlled against the exporter’s income level. 
The income level comes from the log value of the GDP per capita in 2000 US dollars for the 
year 2007 (LogGDP). LogGDP is for the most part significant with a negative coefficient. 
Which means that an increase in GDP per capita decreases the trade gap. 
When running both FSI and LogGDP, in Table 15 the significance of the FSI was for the most 
part unchanged, while the significance dropped for LogGDP. Showing that the trade gap is 
not driven on exporter’s income, but rather the secrecy rating.  
Table 16 shows the quantity gap vs FSI and LogGDP, where quantity gap is defined as the 
difference between reported quantity of import and export. This will show whether the trade 
gap comes from a difference in price or quantity. It shows that the FSI is only significant on 
the 5% level for art objects and not for the other product groups. This indicates that the 
difference in trade comes mostly from a difference in price and not quantity.  
5.3.2 Difference-in-differences robustness check 
In this section I run the DID analysis on the three product groups industrial diamonds (277), 
mineral ores/scraps (289) and toys (894). This is to see if there have been any changes on these 
products. I will control the DID from section 5.2 by omitting the top and bottom 2.5% of 
observations.  
Table 8: Difference-in-differences, robustness check 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 




 (1) (2) (3) 
I(EIA) -0.409 -0.462 -1.105*** 
 (0.277) (0.842) (0.362) 
I(EIA):TH -2.355 -0.136 -1.639 
 (1.767) (1.645) (2.172) 
Fixed effects  Year × Country Year × Country Year × Country 
Observations 1,847 1,440 2,335 
R2 0.261 0.314 0.782 
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.256 0.768 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.297 (df = 1740) 3.826 (df = 1327) 1.951 (df = 2187) 
Note: 
The exchange of information agreement dummy is set to check first for AEOI, then EOIR. I set 1 for the 
signing year, and after for AEOI first, if the country does not have AEOI agreement, it checks for EOIR. Robust 
standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at 
the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
In column 1 and 2 in Table 8 the I(EIA) is not significant. This is to be expected as these 
products did not show any significant relationship with the FSI in Table 7. In column 3, the 
I(EIA) is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -1.105, and the I(EIA):TH is not 
significant. This indicates that the exchange agreements have had an effect on countries not 
classified as a tax haven. This shows that there has been a reduction in the overreporting, 
which further supports that this overreporting is tax driven.  
In  Table 17 I omit the top and bottom 2.5% of observations and rerun the DID analysis done 
in section 5.2. The table shows some drop in significance, but for mostly unchanged. The 





Section 6 - Discussion 
In this section I will discuss the findings to answer the main question: Have exchange of 
information agreements impacted the flow of valuables (for example: art, gold, diamonds, 
etc.) between countries implicated in Money Laundering? I will do this by discussing my two 
hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: There is a trade gap in the flow of valuables between Switzerland and countries 
with strong secrecy. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a decrease in the flow of valuables shortly before, and after the EIAs 
are signed. 
6.1 Evaluating the hypotheses in light of the results 
Hypothesis 1: There is a trade gap in the flow of valuables between Switzerland and countries 
with strong secrecy. 
Section 5.1 demonstrated through trade gap analyses that for most valuables there was a trade 
gap which had a positive relationship with the Financial Secrecy Index. The only valuable that 
did not show a clear relation with the secrecy index was gold. The other products showed a 
strong relation with the FSI. These findings support what was found by Teichmann (2017).  
Figure 10 shows the two possible explanations for trade gap. One of them is trade gap due to 
missing data. A possible explanation for missing data is that countries classified as tax havens 
have poorer infrastructure and therefore do not report everything (Barbieri et al., 2009). This 
was tested against in the robustness check, and there was no relationship between secrecy and 
industrial diamonds/scraps. If the reason were a lack of reporting from countries with higher 
secrecy it would be expected to see the same trend for all product groups, which was not the 
case. There was however a relationship between secrecy and toys, but the gap did not come 
from tax havens underreporting exports, but rather an overreport from countries with low 
secrecy. This gave a negative trade gap from countries with a lower secrecy rating. An 
incentive for overreporting exports can be to take advantage of export credits. The event study 
in Figure 15 shows that there is no difference between tax havens and non-tax havens over 




Figure 10: Explanation for the trade gap 
 
Since the difference between tax havens and non-tax havens was almost nonexistent for these 
products, and there was a difference when looking at the value preserving objects, this 
indicates that the differences in trade gap do not come from a lack of reporting / missing data. 
Since the trade gap most likely does not come from a lack of reporting, the other explanation 
would be that the trade gap comes from a lack in records / smuggling. Table 16 indicates that 
the trade gap does for the most part not come from a quantity difference. This means that the 
trade gap comes from price differences. The only legitimate deviation in price differences 
should come from shipping costs and insurance costs (Collin, 2020). The trade gap for 
valuables were also mostly positive, which means it was not intended to avoid tariffs, but 
rather from a desire to move money secretly or illicitly.  
Overall, the trade gap seems to come from a lack of recordings, and it cannot be explained by 
shipping and insurance costs alone. The trade gap for valuables does for the most part have a 
significant and positive relationship with secrecy. The trade gap analyses therefore confirms 
hypothesis 1. There exists a trade gap of valuables between countries with strong secrecy, and 





Hypothesis 2: There is a decrease in the flow of valuables shortly before, and after the EIAs 
are signed. 
Hypothesis 1 confirms that there exists a trade gap, I can therefore proceed to control 
hypothesis 2 as to whether this trade gap gets affected by EIAs. In Figure 9 it shows a trend 
where the trade gap starts to decrease around 1 year prior to signing the agreement and 
continuously after. This is shown more clearly for the countries that are classified as tax havens 
as they had a much larger gap to begin with before the agreements were signed and show a 
steep decline after signing. There are fewer observations in some years for some products, so 
the error bars overlap such that it is not possible to say that the EIA has had an effect 
conclusively for those years, but it gives indicative evidence that the agreements have had an 
effect. 
The event study also shows some interesting trends. For example, for art and collectibles the 
trend shows that the trade gap decreases for tax havens, but it increases for non-tax havens. A 
reason for this could be that there has been a shift from tax havens to other countries that are 
not classified as tax havens. For gold it has the opposite effect. The trade gap for gold shows 
an increase for tax havens after signing the agreement and decrease for non-tax havens. This 
could be because that gold is now more used for ML or tax evasion then before the agreement. 
Diamonds, pearls, and precious stones have a clear trend, and it shows a very clear decrease 
after signing the agreement for both tax havens and non-tax havens. This suggests that these 
products are now not used as much for ML or tax evasion. 
That the agreements have had a negative effect indicates that the trade gap comes from illicit 
financial flows. Previous research showed that there was a shift in capital moving when EIAs 
were signed, which could be because tax evaders no longer wanted to store their capital in 
those tax shelters as they would send tax information to their home country. In this case it 
shows the same trend, which points to that these value preserving objects are used as means 






Section 7 - Conclusion 
The question this thesis hoped to answer was whether the exchange of information agreements 
had an impact of the flow of valuables between countries implicated in ML. In this thesis this 
has been answered through testing two hypotheses. The first to see whether or not there exists 
a flow of valuables to begin with, and the second to test if that flow has been impacted by 
exchange of information agreement. 
The results show that there exists a positive relationship between trade gap and secrecy. This 
means that countries that score higher on the FSI rating have a larger trade gap. Countries that 
score high on the FSI rating are countries that are also typically on tax haven lists. These 
countries also are linked to tax evasion and ML.  
The difference-in-differences analyses, and event studies show that there is evidence that the 
exchange agreements have had an effect on the trade gap. They show that after signing the 
agreements the trade gap has been reduced. The event study shows that for most valuables the 
decline starts 1 year prior to signing the agreement. This is in line with previous research in 
that for capital, there have been shifts after signing the agreement. This further indicates that 
the flow of valuables is connected to tax evasion and ML, since it has had an effect. There is 
only indicative evidence though, due to a large spread in the data.  
The implications of these results are that there should be more efforts put into looking into 
how value preserving objects are used for ML and/or tax evasion, and how exchange of 
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Section 8 - Appendices 
8.1 Appendix A Lists of pre-defined tax havens 
Table 9: Overview over blacklists 
OECD (CBI)1 
FATF2 EU3 Oxfam4 IMF5 
Antigua and Barbuda Iran 









Dominica (new) Antigua and Barbuda  
Cayman Islands 
Barbados Barbados Fiji Aruba  Hong Kong 
Cyprus Botswana Guam Bahamas  Ireland 
Dominica Burkina Faso Palau Bahrain  Luxembourg 
Grenada Cambodia Panama Bermuda  Netherlands 
Malta Cayman Islands Samoa Bosnia and Herzegovina  Singapore 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Ghana Seychelles British Virgin Islands   
Saint Lucia Jamaica 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Cayman Islands  
  
Seychelles Mauritius 
US Virgin Islands Cook Islands  
  
Turks and Caicos Islands Morocco Vanuatu Curacao    
United Arab Emirates Myanmar   Faroe Islands    
Vanuatu Nicaragua   Gibraltar    
  Pakistan   Greenland    
  Panama   Guam    
  Senegal   Hong Kong    
  Syria   Jersey    
  Uganda   Macedonia    
  Yemen   Marshall Islands    
  Zimbabwe   Mauritius   
      Montenegro    
      Nauru    
      New Caledonia   
      Niue    
      Oman    
      Palau    
      Serbia    
      Singapore    
      Switzerland    




      Trinidad and Tobago    
      United Arab Emirates    
      US Virgin Islands    
      Vanuatu    
1. Retrieved from OECD (2021b) 
2. Countries from ‘graylist’ in gray. Retrieved from FATF (2021) 
3. Retrieved from European Council (2021) 
4. Retrieved from Chardonnet and Langerock (2017) 




Table 10: OECD original blacklist 
Andorra 
Maldives 
Anguilla  Marshall Islands 
Antigua and Barbuda  Monaco 
Aruba Nauru 
Bahrain Netherlands Antilles 
Barbados Niue - New Zealand 
Belize Panama 
British Virgin Islands Samoa 
Cook Islands - New Zealand Seychelles 
Dominica St. Lucia 
Gibraltar 
The Federation of St. Christopher & 
Nevis 
Grenada St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney Tonga 
Isle of Man Turks & Caicos 
Jersey US Virgin Islands 
Liberia Vanuatu 
Lichtenstein   
Retrieved from OECD (2001) 
Appendix B Additional trade gap analysis 
Table 11 shows the summary statistics of the trade gap and quantity gap.  
Table 11: Summary statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max Observations 
Panel A: Trade gap      
Art & Coll. 0.565 2.865 -9.909 12.789 28,594 
Paintings 1.409 2.595 -7.068 12.789 2,849 




Diamonds, Pearls & 
Precious stones 
1.426 4.056 -12.822 13.385 8,387 
Pearls 1.363 2.940 -7.728 9.758 1,071 
Diamonds 2.678 4.605 -12.822 13.432 1,593 
Precious Stones 2.281 3.078 -7.457 11.348 2,005 
Gold -1.139 5.955 -15.570 15.895 1,946 
Panel B: Quantity gap1      
Art & Coll. 0.818 3.170 -11.900 11.600 28,594 
Paintings 1.370 2.940 -9.460 11.300 2,849 
Antiques 1.330 2.750 -8.530 10.600 1,640 
Diamonds, Pearls & 
Precious stones 
0.466 2.960 -13.400 10.900 8,387 
Pearls 0.490 1.670 -6.980 9.330 1,071 
Diamonds -0.257 1.680 -10.500 4.810 1,593 
Precious Stones 1.260 2.580 -7.930 10.200 2,005 
Gold -1.070 4.780 -22.700 12.500 1,946 
Note:  Quantity gap is the log gap of the difference between reported quantity of imports and exports. 
 
 
The graphs below visualize the raw relationship between trade gap and Financial Secrecy 





Figure 11: Trade gap vs FSI, art, collectibles and antiques 
 







Figure 13: Trade gap vs FSI, robustness check 
 
Appendix C Additional regression results 
Table 12 shows the relationship between trade gap and the Tax Haven indicator. It shows that 
there is a strong positive relationship between trade gap and tax haven.  
Table 12: Trade gap vs Tax Haven Indicator, regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
THc 2.587
*** 2.474*** 2.926*** 4.225*** 3.420*** 5.053*** 3.604*** 2.471*** 




Fixed effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations 28,594 2,849 1,640 8,387 1,071 1,593 2,005 1,946 
R2 0.059 0.118 0.139 0.138 0.239 0.186 0.187 0.286 






















Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 
5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
Table 13 shows the relation between trade gap and the Financial Secrecy Index with the top 
and bottom 2.5 percent of the observations removed.  
Table 13: Trade gap vs FSI, regression results - omitting bottom and top 2.5 
percent 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FSI 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.134*** 0.091*** 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations 27,161 2,706 1,558 7,827 1,004 1,497 1,904 1,848 
R2 0.033 0.071 0.143 0.078 0.223 0.118 0.124 0.201 






















Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % 
level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
Table 14 shows the relation between trade gap and the log values of the exporter’s GDP for 
the year 2007. The GDP is per capita in 2000 US, retrieved from the worldbank (The World 





Table 14: Trade gap vs GDP, regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LogGDP -0.724*** -0.996*** -1.170*** -0.703 -0.978*** -0.878 -0.847** -0.329 
 (0.203) (0.299) (0.238) (0.490) (0.364) (0.589) (0.419) (0.545) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations 28,071 2,782 1,613 8,273 1,054 1,582 1,985 1,921 
R2 0.024 0.094 0.110 0.019 0.108 0.040 0.076 0.273 






















Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 
% level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
Table 15 shows the relation between trade gap and the Financial Secrecy Index with the log 
values of the exporter’s income level. The exporter’s income level is represented using the log 
values of GDP for 2007 per capita in 2000 US dollars.  
Table 15: Trade gap vs FSI and GDP, regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FSI 0.064*** 0.059** 0.086*** 0.141*** 0.122*** 0.166*** 0.102*** 0.033 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.039) (0.030) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) 
LogGDP -0.330 -0.669* -0.756*** -0.064 -0.510 -0.139 -0.331 -0.096 




Fixed effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations 28,071 2,782 1,613 8,273 1,054 1,582 1,985 1,921 
R2 0.055 0.135 0.182 0.118 0.255 0.148 0.158 0.275 























Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 
% level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
Table 16 shows the gap in quantity against the FSI and GDP. This is to show if the trade gap 
comes from a gap in quantity or price.  
Table 16: Quantity gap vs FSI and GDP, regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Quantity gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FSI 0.083** 0.042** 0.053*** 0.013 0.022 0.005 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.034) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) 
LogGDP2007 -0.054 -0.356 -0.474* -0.281 -0.128 -0.284** -0.264 0.031 
 (0.533) (0.272) (0.260) (0.221) (0.182) (0.132) (0.247) (0.431) 
Fixed effects         
Observations 28,071 2,782 1,613 8,273 1,054 1,582 1,985 1,921 
R2 0.090 0.133 0.201 0.030 0.108 0.085 0.150 0.260 























Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries in parentheses. ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 





Appendix D Additional difference-in-differences results 
Table 17 shows the relation between I(EIA) and I(EIA):TH and the Financial Secrecy Index 
with the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the observations removed. 
Table 17: Difference-in-differences - omitting bottom and top 2.5 percent 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trade gap 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I(EIA) 0.348** 0.290 0.280 -0.356 0.274 -2.085*** -0.431 -2.615*** 
 (0.133) (0.201) (0.341) (0.286) (0.342) (0.733) (0.535) (0.879) 
I(EIA):TH -2.166*** -1.543** -1.853 -1.937 -1.494 -1.097 -0.462 -1.125* 
 (0.827) (0.748) (1.866) (1.219) (0.982) (1.954) (1.248) (0.630) 
Fixed effects 
















Observations 27,161 2,706 1,558 7,967 1,017 1,513 1,904 1,848 
R2 0.087 0.340 0.469 0.281 0.517 0.587 0.523 0.519 



















3.760 (df = 
1716) 
Note: 
The exchange of information agreement dummy is set to check first for AEOI, then EOIR. I set 1 for the signing year, and after for 
AEOI first, if the country does not have AEOI agreement, it checks for EOIR. Robust standard errors clustered by partner countries 
in parentheses.  ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level 
 
Appendix E Additional event studies 
Event study per product, where the log of trade gap is grouped into TH and non-TH. TH is 




Figure 14: Event study, all products individually 
 
In Figure 15 I do an event study of the three products used in the robustness check.  
Figure 15: Event study, robustness check 
 
